The Crisis of Subjectivity from Nietzsche to Heidegger by Vattimo, Gianni
Differentia: Review of Italian Thought 
Number 1 Autumn Article 5 
1986 
The Crisis of Subjectivity from Nietzsche to Heidegger 
Gianni Vattimo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia 
Recommended Citation 
Vattimo, Gianni (1986) "The Crisis of Subjectivity from Nietzsche to Heidegger," Differentia: Review of 
Italian Thought: Vol. 1 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia/vol1/iss1/5 
This document is brought to you for free and open access by Academic Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Differentia: Review of Italian Thought by an authorized editor of Academic Commons. For more 
information, please contact mona.ramonetti@stonybrook.edu, hu.wang.2@stonybrook.edu. 
The Crisis of 
Subjectivity from 
Nietzsche to Heidegger 
Gianni Vattimo 
1. NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER AND POSTMODERNITY 
The title of this paper should not be understood in a narrowly 
chronological way, as if we merely wanted to explore the history 
of the notion of subjectivity during that period of philosophy that 
begins with Nietzsche and ends with Heidegger. I believe that 
these two names mark out a unifying theoretical strand which 
indicates a continuous development transcending their different 
approaches or results. This development can have philosophical 
significance to the degree that it involves the destiny, the vicis-
situdes not only of the notion of subject in the two thinkers, but 
also of the subject itself in an epoch of which Nietzsche and 
Heidegger are here considered the supreme interpreters. In other 
words, our initial thesis is that there exists between Nietzsche 
and Heidegger a substantial theoretical continuity, and that they 
[Translated from the Italian by Peter Carravetta] 
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are basically saying "the same thing." To acknowledge this "same 
thing" means pointing to certain conceptual parallels and 
analogies between the two thinkers and then proceeding to place 
these similarities within an epochal horizon in order to see them 
as modes of revelation of a destiny which concerns (our) subjec-
tivity in the present age. 
. Obviously, we are not dealing with a set of "neutral" or de-
scriptive premises. And if this is true for every discourse in philos-
ophy-even the most explicitly programmatic study of sources 
and "data" -then it ought to be especially valid for thinkers like 
Nietzsche and Heidegger who described themselves as "epochal" 
thinkers: representatives of a way of thinking whose "truth" is 
also and perhaps above all the truth of an epoch. In this they 
resemble Hegel, though their tone is fundamentally critical-
destructive rather than triumphant. 
The thesis concerning a concrete theoretical continuity 
between Nietzsche and Heidegger is not at all so evident if we 
recall how Heidegger himself considers Nietzsche the culmination 
of metaphysics and its inherent nihilism. Heidegger in fact consid-
ers it his task to go beyond metaphysics and nihilism, suggesting 
his radical discontinuity with the tradition that peaks in Nietzsche. 
Of course, in Heidegger's own texts dealing with this problem-in 
a sense, this means all his mature writings-the relationship be-
tween post-metaphysical thought and the nihilism of achieved 
[ compiuta] metaphysics is not so clear-cut and schematic, and raises 
several interpretive problems. And while it is acceptable to call 
Nietzsche a nihilist, calling Heidegger one can seem scandalous. 
This issue could be developed at length. 1 Yet I feel that one of 
the most pressing tasks for philosophy today, one of its crucial 
theoretical aims, consists precisely in clarifying the ambiguities of 
the Nietzsche-Heidegger relationship-recognizing their pro-
found continuity, the fact that they say the "same thing": nihilism. 
If, as we hinted above, this continuity is not only a fact that 
can be inferred from the texts of these two philosophers, but also 
perhaps above all the result of a reflection on their epochal mean-
ing, then clearly in this second sense we must, as good hermeneu-
tists, fall back on a shared "pre-understanding" of the salient traits 
of our present epoch. This pre-understanding is, after all, what 
gave life to philosophy when it appealed to "experience," which 
was never that imprinting of signs and traces on the mental tabula 
rasa of a distorted, schematic empiricism. Rather, pre-understand-
ing is a historically qualified experience, "knowledge of the 
world," familiarity and expectation, memory, language. So the 
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thesis of the continuity between Nietzsche and Heidegger is based 
not only on the ir texts, but also on our pre-understanding of the 
meaning of our historical existence in the present age. Reflecting 
upon this continuity means, therefore, activating and deepening 
this pre-understanding which, though seemingly vague and inde-
terminate, is nonetheless the guide and support of all thinking 
processes . As the horizon of our experience, such a supporting 
[reggente] pre-understanding must remain by and large implicit, 
though it is important to remain aware of it and its possibilities. 
In fact, it can even be perceived through the several signs and 
"symptoms" of our discourse. For instance, the theoretical as well 
as experiential-epochal horizon within which we can speak of a 
Nietzsche-Heidegger continuity, together with the corollary of a 
Heideggerian "nihilism," coincides with what hermeneutics calls 
the philosophical koine of our epoch. 2 In other words, though we 
cannot once and for all give form to the contemporary pre-under-
standing which acts as the background of the Nietzsche-Heidegger 
continuity, we can certainly describe some of its traits more 
precisely. One of these is the demonstrable, pervasive presence-
since at least the mid-seventies-of hermeneutics. This philos-
ophy, which revolves around the problem of interpretation, harks 
back to Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Nietzsche and Heidegger, and 
was developed in different directions but with shared concerns 
by philosophers like Gadamer, Pareyson, Ricoeur, Jauss and 
Rorty, who contributes an explicit attention to pragmatism. Thus 
broadly understood, hermeneutics can include philosophers such 
as Karl Otto Apel, the most recent Habermas, Foucault, and Der-
rida, whose philosophies do not properly speaking belong to its 
main trunk yet are profoundly related to it. Above all, the her-
meneutic koine constitutes today not only a field for theoretical 
speculation, but the underlying methodological self-consciousness 
of much literary and art criticism and of many trends in history, 
psychology and the social sciences . In short, the role and position 
of hermeneutics in contemporary European thought can be com-
pared-though with different modalities and implications-to the 
importance of Marxism in the fifties 3 and structuralism in the 
sixties-seven ties . 
If this is the situation, then we are living in an age whose 
characteristic cultural "atmosphere" or "mood" facilitates the un-
derstanding of the Nietzsche-Heidegger continuity. In fact, above 
and beyond Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, hermeneutics is 
the unifying thread of the two philosophies . I believe that in 
speaking of this relationship I am not necessarily endorsing some 
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misguided historiography, or-as Habermas said of Gadamer 4-
excessive "urbanization" of both Nietzsche and Heidegger, but 
the fact that there is indeed such a deeply rooted process in motion 
within our culture. If it is to remain true to the imperative of 
"saving the phenomena" which has guided it since ancient times, 
then philosophical reflection must reckon with this fact of our 
everyday experience, must "save" it. 
To conclude these prefatory remarks, 5 it is likely that recogniz-
ing this concrete continuity between Nietzsche and Heidegger 
constitutes also the decisive trait of what we call the postmodern 
in philosophy. As will become evident shortly, this continuity 
actually points toward the dissolution not only of "modern" sub-
jectivity, but also, and more generically, of being itself-no longer 
structure but event, no longer origin or foundation but calling 
and "narration" [racconto]. This seems to be the sense of that 
devaluation [alleggerimento] of reality which is taking place in our 
lives, which are determined by those typically postmodern trans-
formations of technology. 6 
2. FROM THE UNMASKING OF THE SUBJECT TO NIHILISM 
Within this perspective, let me dwell further on my title's 
"crisis of subjectivity." If there is a difference between Nietzsche 
and Heidegger, it is this: Heidegger achieves that passage into 
postmodernity which Nietzsche merely announces and sets in 
motion. Yet there are parallels in their writings about post-
modernity's crisis of the subject. 
In Nietzsche the crisis of subjectivity is announced primarily 
as the unmasking of the superficiality of consciousness. 7 This is 
one of the meanings of The Birth of Tragedy's distinction between 
Apollonian and Dionysian. Socrates, the champion of the Apollo-
nian-of what is definite, rational, disengaged from the Dionysian: 
myth, irrationality, sensuality, the experience of living and 
dying-is also the champion of self-consciousness. How else jus-
tify his "knowing that he does not know"? But it is precisely 
to the degree that he absolutizes, distancing himself from his 
mythical, irrational, vital Dionysian roots to assume the task of a 
global Aufkliirung, that his Apollonian rationality loses all vitality 
and becomes decadence. The Birth of Tragedy's criterion for con-
demning Socratism is not truth, but life; Socratic self-conscious-
ness is "critiqued" and unmasked not because it is non-true, but 
because it is non-vital. This prefigures several complex 
developments in Nietzsche's subsequent unmasking of definite 
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forms, of values, and of the very notion of truth. The "suspicion" 
aroused by self-conscious subjectivity is certainly inspired by the 
discovery that the forms which fed it, previously considered stable 
and definite, are actually "false," being no more than sublimating 
appearances designed to comfort. However, these forms are un-
masked and condemned not only for this, but also because, much 
like Socratic "'enlightened" rationalism, they aspire to truth, forget-
ting that as deceptions they are bound to life, to the Dionysian. 
The complexity of this perspective will be found, expressed differ-
ently, in Nietzsche's subsequent work, yet already in The Birth of 
Tragedy we find that he cannot stop with the unmasking of super-
ficiality, of non-truth, of the self-consciousness of the subject: he 
must go on, advancing toward nihilism and the dissolution of the 
very notions of truth and being. 
In the works that follow The Birth of Tragedy, beginning with 
the Untimely Meditations and Human, Too Human, the unmasking 
of the superficiality of the self-conscious subject will in fact develop 
side by side with the unmasking of the notion of truth and with 
the broader dissolution of being as foundation. One can in fact 
say that the most representative expression of the crisis of subjec-
tivity in Nietzsche is the announcement that "God is dead," which 
is formulated for the first time in The Gay Science and can be used 
as the emblematic utterance of Nietzsche's whole itinerary after 
his text on tragedy. 
Nietzsche's radical unmasking of the superficiality of the I 
proceeds mainly through the awareness of the interplay of forces 
in social relations, especially power relations. The unpublished 
text On Truth and Deceit in an Extra-Moral Sense shows how the 
world of truth and logic is constructed on the basis of an" obligation 
to deceive according to rules," socially determined and according 
to a system of metaphors warranted and legitimized by society. 
At the same time, all other metaphoric systems which herald 
creativity in the individual, if not relegated to the unconscious, 
are demoted to "poetic fictions." Human, Too Human will conduct 
its entire critique of knowledge with similar arguments, insisting 
also on the fact that what we consider conscious experience is 
whatever we have a language for, names and possibilities of de-
scription in a socially convened and imposed model language. 
The world of consciousness will therefore tend to attain the con-
figuration of a world of awarenesses shared by society and im-
posed on us via the conditioning that language requires. But 
there's more: for the contents of our consciousness that concern 
the phenomenal world are not the only "fictions" regulated by 
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social conventions; the image the I has of itself, in short self-con-
sciousness in its true sense, is now seen as the image of ourselves 
which others communicate to us (and which we accept and adopt 
for reasons of security: in order to defend ourselves we must in 
fact introject others' perceptions of us, making our calculations 
accordingly; in the struggle for survival, mimicry, camouflage 
[mimetismo] is a crucial instrument). 8 That which we call egoism 
is therefore only an "apparent egoism," as the title of aphorism 
105 in Dawn says explicitly: 
Pseudo-egoism.-Whatever they may think and say about their 
'egoism,' the great majority nonetheless do nothing for their ego 
their whole life long: what they do is done for the phantom of their 
ego which has formed itself in the heads of those around them and 
has been communicated to them; . .. all of them dwell in a fog of 
impersonal, semi-personal opinions ... all these people, un-
known to themselves, believe in the bloodless abstraction 'man,' 
that is to say, in a fiction. [Hollingdale trans .] 
This fiction is precisely the result of these impersonal, diffuse and 
all-pervading opinions which go on developing independently 
from the lives of individuals. The "social phantom" character of 
the ego has both "linguistic" and "disciplinary" roots . Linguistic 
because in order to communicate there's an obligation to deceive 
according to a system of socially accepted lies or metaphors; dis-
ciplinary because the necessity to communicate our needs to others 
forces us to know and describe them in a systematic manner which 
is ultimately superficial. All of these exigencies seem to culminate 
in the retation between "those who command and those who 
obey," a relation which above all else requires self-consciousness. 9 
If, on the one hand, the critique of the superficiality of con-
sciousness and therefore of the subject in its most classical, 
metaphysical definition develops in the direction of the unmasking 
of its alleged immediacy and "finality," and is brought back to 
the interplay of forces over which the subject has no control (being 
rather its result and expression); on the other hand, as it first 
appeared in the play between the Apollonian and the Dionysian 
in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche continues at the same time on 
the road toward the ever more explicit awareness of the "necessity 
of error" (cf . Human, Too Human, Part I), a condition expressed in 
emblematic terms in aphorism 361 of The Gay Science, "The Problem 
of the Comedian," where we find an entire philosophy of culture 
as the production of "lies," systems of concepts and values that 
have no possibility of being "legitimated" vis-a-vis the true reality 
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of things. These lawful deceits are borne by and multiply solely 
from the manifestation of a capacity to lie and to mask oneself 
which, though in origin an instrument of defense and survival, 
is now autonomous and develops beyond any possible vital func-
tion. Thus lying, metaphor, the inventiveness of culture creating 
worlds of appearances cannot any longer legitimize itself in terms 
of foundation, not even with the perspective of a vitalistic prag-
matism. The discovery of lying, or of "dreaming" (as Nietzsche 
says in aphorism 54 of The Gay Science) does not mean that we 
can stop lying and dreaming, but only that we must continue 
dreaming knowing that we are dreaming: only thus can we avoid 
perishing. 
The whirlwind circularity of the conclusion of aphorism 54 
in The Gay Science locates, in its broadest implications, the terms 
of the "crisis of subjectivity" the way Nietzsche discovered it and 
lived it: once unmasked, the superficiality of consciousness does 
not become the path to a new, more secure foundation. The non-fi-
nality of consciousness means, on the other hand, the end of any 
finality [ultimita], the impossibility, therefore, of thinking in terms 
of a foundation, and from that the general need to make adjust-
ments in the definition of truth and of being. This broadening of 
the unmasking discourse to its most radical and vast ontological 
terms is actually the direction Nietzsche's mature works take, 
from Zarathustra onward. This period is marked by the discovery 
of the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same, of nihilism, of 
the will to power and the overman: all these terms define, much 
more than a positive, Nietzschean philosophy, his own ever prob-
lematic effort to realize an ontology after the end of foundational 
thinking, after the death of God. As far as the problem of subjec-
tivity is concerned, the term with which Nietzsche defines his 
vision of a humanity no longer "subject(ed)" (in all its meanings 
and correlations, from subjectivity to subjugation) is that of Ueber-
mensch, superman [superuomo] or, better, overman [oltreuomo].10 
The problem with the notion of the overman consists in the 
fact that its most typical reading seems to lead to the position of 
metaphysical subjectivity-self-consciousness, self-control, will to 
power against others-and, what's more, a subjectivity that 
strengthens its more traditional aspects. Yet in the philosophy of 
eternal recurrence, in which "there are no facts, only interpreta-
tions, "11 even the idea that there could only be interpreters "is 
only an interpretation." 
Everything is subjective, you say; but this is already an interpretation, 
the "subject" is not a given, it is only something added through 
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the imagination , something stuck on afterwards. Is it finally neces-
sary to place the interpreter behind the interpretation? But this is 
already invention, hypothesis. 12 
12 
If it is difficult to establish what or who is the overman, one thing 
is certain: it is not a strengthened form of metaphysical subjectiv-
ity, at least not in the sense of self-consciousness and will. In fact 
even will itself, which does nevertheless play such a central role 
in the later Nietzsche, is taken within the interplay of negation 
and de-founding [sfondamento] according to which everything is 
interpretation, even this very thesis. Within this context, what 
appears to give a positive-though problematic-characterization 
to man no longer subject, is his capacity to negate himself as 
subject, to go beyond all imperatives of self-preservation in the 
direction of limitless experimentation. This suggests, to some ex-
tent, the Schopenhauerian version of Kant's aesthetic disinterest, 
though radicalized even more.13 
Ascetic Ideals and all the complex, cruel games that moral 
and metaphysical man has played and dealt himself-and which 
today are further developed by the mindless hubris of technicians 
and engineers 14-all seem to attest to the fact that with man there 
came upon the earth an unprecedented phenomenon, an animal 
capable of turning against himself, against his own spirit of self-
preservation: 
the existence on earth of an animal soul turned against itself, taking 
sides against itself, was something so new, profound, unheard of, 
enigmatic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future that the aspect 
of the earth was essentially altered. 15 
The capacity to experiment beyond the interests of conservation 
is realized, according to Nietzsche, in the mindless or casual [spen-
sierata] inventiveness of the technicians and the engineers-which 
makes one think that science and technology have a decisive role 
in defining man's new position, no longer subject, in the world. 
But these are fleeting remarks . For Nietzsche, the exemplary figure 
of the overman is, in a fundamental sense, the artist . The "ultra-
human" path of art which he sketches in his last writings seems 
to point to the two main roads traveled by the avant-gardes of 
the twentieth century: on the one hand, the will to forms, the 
most radical technical experimentation conceivable; and on the 
other the dissolution of any rule of form in the name of an art no 
longer subjected to constructive ideals, but rather well on its way 
to the extreme experience of destructuration, toward the end of 
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any hierarchy within the product as well as of the artist or con-
sumer as "subjects." 
The open-ended problematic in which the figure of the over-
man remains does not only, or primarily, indicate a theoretical 
inconclusiveness or even an aporia that may characterize 
Nietzsche's thought. In expanding to a general ontological dis-
course that beckons the dissolution of being as foundation, this 
problematic alludes to the impossibility of redefining subjectivity 
by means of a simple theoretical design, with a "clarification" of 
concepts or a taking hold of errors. Metaphysics, Heidegger 
claims, is not merely an error we can escape, an opinion we can 
discard once we recognize its falsity. 16 Thus the collapse [insos-
tenibilita] of the notion of subjectivity reflects the collapse of sub-
jectivity itself in the world, in the present epoch of being: it cannot 
find a pacifying theoretical resolution at the hands of some clever 
thinker. 
The same itinerary that stretches from the unmasking of the 
metaphysical subject to the dissolution of being as foundation and 
to nihilism can also be employed to characterize Heidegger's medi-
tation, though in different terms. Here again I must proceed 
sketchily, referring the reader to my more extensive treatments 
of the topic. 17 Guided loosely by the analogy with Nietzsche, one 
might say that what we can call the "unmasking" [smascheramento] 
of the subject in Heidegger's thought is the critique of the concep-
tions of man as a Vorhandenes, a "thing" among many other things 
characterized solely by specific attributes (for example,as Heideg-
ger says in his text on Humanism, the metaphysical definition of 
man as a member of the animal genus endowed with reason as 
its specific difference) . In Being and Time man is not thinkable as 
a subject precisely because this would make him something 
"merely present ." Man is, instead, the Dasein, being-there [l' es-
serci], that is, above all, projection. For Heidegger, the subject is 
characterized by a substantiality which is no longer present in 
Dasein as project: man is defined not as a given determinate sub-
stance, but as a "having-to-be," an opening upon possibility. Da-
sein thinks of itself as subject, that is, as substance, only when it 
thinks itself inauthentically, with the horizon of the public and 
everyday "they ."18 
The "definition" of Dasein in terms of projection rather than 
in terms of subjectivity does not, however, evidence the character 
of an unmasking which leads to a new and more satisfying (and 
reassuring) foundation . To say that Dasein is projection opens 
up, in fact, the question of authenticity, which is central to Sein 
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und Zeit and, in different terms, throughout Heidegger's sub-
sequent development. Since the project cannot be made authentic 
by referring to any sort of pre-given substantiality-for example, 
a "nature," or an essence, etc.-it can only achieve authenticity 
by choosing the possibility which is most proper, but not in the 
sense of "appropriate" (which legitimates by referring to a basic 
structure or substance), but in the sense of being unavoidable and 
ever open as possibility which, as long as Dasein is, remains such. 
This "most proper" possibility is the impending possibility of 
death. The project which is Dasein is authentically chosen only 
insofar as it decides ahead of time with regard to its own death. 
As is well known, Heidegger refuses to describe in existential 
terms the meaning of this anticipatory decision: it does not obvi -
ously correspond to the decision to put an end to one's life by 
means of suicide, nor does it entail a "thinking about death" in 
terms of the Christian warning about becoming dust. 19 The content 
couched in the notion of the anticipatory decision concerning 
death is rather to be sought in those pages of the second section 
of Being and Time-those pages which open up with the problem-
atic of being-towards-death-where Heidegger speaks of our his-
torical heritage (see especially par. 74); and in those pages where 
he speaks of the relationship of Dasein with others (par. 53). The 
meaning of these pages can be gathered by reading a passage 
from a much later work, Der Satz vom Grund, 20 in which Heidegger 
no longer speaks of authenticity or inauthenticity. These terms 
and problems are now channeled, and transformed, in the new 
thematic of the eventuality of being. The shift can be best under-
stood if we bear in mind the terminology of the original German: 
authentic is eigentlich; event is Er-eignis. What they both have in 
common is the root eigen, which means "proper." In this passage, 
what in Being and Time was the anticipatory decision concerning 
death now becomes the "leap" in the abyss of the "liberating tie 
with tradition . "21 The tradition of which Heidegger speaks in Der 
Satz vom Grund is not what in Being and Time is called Tradition, 
which was characterized as an acceptance of the past as both dead 
and irrevocable (therefore anything but liberating). Within Tradi-
tion the past is conceived as vergangen, and this represents the 
mode according to which inauthentic experience is related to the 
past. True authentic existence thinks the past, instead, as gewesen 
-not as "past," dead and irrevocable, but as "having been"-and 
its tradition is now called Ueber-lieferung, with the German root 
word meaning ueber-liefern, that is, trans-mitting. If we now turn 
to Being and Time for the difference between Tradition and Ueber-
lieferung, between accepting the past as vergangen and the capacity 
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to hand it down as gewesen, we find that in the latter case the past 
is accepted within the perspective of the anticipatory decision of 
death. Only by projecting itself in anticipation of one's own death 
can Being see the past as history, as a heritage of yet open pos-
sibilities which speak as models of possibility as well as possible 
models. The authentic relationship with the past is opened up by 
the awareness of one's own mortality, a condition that assumes 
as only mortal even the traces and the models which have been 
handed down through history. The leap into the Ueberlieferung is 
a liberating move because it removes us from the order of the 
"given," that is, from what is inherited (and within which the 
project of Dasein finds itself thrown), or the finality of a "natural 
order": the leap into the Ueberlieferung is (only) event, only trace 
of other possible-mortal existences which Dasein accepts or rejects 
as possibilities still open to it. 22 
What we are dealing with is a topic which seems very far 
from Nietzsche's. The similarity and the parallels which, in this 
light, exist between the Nietzschean and the Heideggerian 
itineraries will appear less problematic if we think for a moment 
that here, also, as with Nietzsche, what takes place during the 
meditation upon the limits and the untenability of (the notion of) 
subjectivity is the discovery of the groundlessness of being. The 
discourse on the possible authenticity of Dasein deals in fact with 
Being itself, and it is no mere accident that in Heidegger's later 
writings this discourse opens up to being as event. The question 
of authenticity is not purely a problem of an "ethical" or 
"psychological" aspect of that particular being (i.e.: entity) called 
Dasein. Already in Being and Time things, objects, the world in its 
wholeness come to Being, or give themselves as entities, only 
insofar as there's Being-there, Dasein which opens up the horizon 
of their givenness. Therefore there's no being outside, or before, 
or independently of the thrown project which Dasein is. That this 
project can realize itself as authentic only insofar as it decides 
concerning its own death-that is to say, in the form of the liberat-
ing bond with tradition, in assuming the historical heritage as 
gewesen, possibility, having-been-mortality-all this means (with 
the help of passages which we cannot reconstruct here in analytic 
fashion but, which are certainly understandable to the reader of 
Heidegger's last writings), that Being is Event, that Being is not, 
but happens, gives itself. Within the framework of our guiding 
hypothesis, this is also what we can call Heidegger's nihilism. 
Like Nietzsche, Heidegger expands the collapse of metaphysical 
subjectivity into a general ontological discourse which experiences 
the "de-grounding" [sfondamento] of Being by discovering the con-
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stitutive relationship between existence and death. Existence ap-
propriates and becomes authentic [eigen-tlich] only insofar as it 
lets itself be expropriated, deciding towards its own death in the 
event [Er-eignis] which is both expropriating and transpropriating 
[ ent-eignend and ueber-eignend]. This is being itself as Ueber-lieferung, 
transmission of traces, messages, linguistic formations in which 
alone our experience of the world is rendered possible, and in 
which things come to Being. 
This breaking-through or de-grounding towards ontology-a 
nihilistic ontology, to be sure, and another trait that links Nietzsche 
and Heidegger-takes place, as hinted above, not as the result of 
a pure shifting of concepts, but in relation to more general trans-
formations in the conditions of existence which have to do with 
modern technology and its rationalization in today's world. In 
Nietzsche, the line of reasoning is very straightforward: the death 
of God means the end of belief in ultimate values and foundation, 
because these beliefs corresponded to the need for reassurance 
typical of a humanity somehow still "primitive." The rationaliza-
tion <!nd organization of social work and the development of sci-
ence and technology which have been made possible precisely by 
the religious-metaphysical vision of the world (we can think of 
the sociology of religion in Max Weber and the relationship he 
established between capitalistic science-technology and Judeo-
Christian monotheism) have rendered these beliefs superfluous. 
This is, incidentally, another way of conceiving nihilism. The des-
tiny of subjectivity unveiled in its groundlessness, and the nihilis-
tic dissolution of Being are thus inextricably bound up with each 
other and with the history of the technico-scientific rationalization 
of the world. It is precisely the technical organization of the world 
that makes obsolete both being as foundation and the hierarchic, 
dominated structure of self-consciousness or subjectivity. 
In Heidegger the passage from the level of the existential 
analytic (in Being and Time) to that of the history of metaphysics 
as the history of being-which corresponds to the "turn" in his 
thought beginning in the thirties-takes place precisely in refer-
ence to the awareness that, in a world like ours and his, made 
up of great historical powers which tend to be totalizing and totali-
tarian, the essence of man cannot (any longer, if it ever could) 
think itself in terms of individual structures, or in terms of supra-
historical definitions . It should not be difficult to show, if we bear 
in mind those "historically" more compromised and compromis-
ing pages of the Introduction to Metaphysics (the 1935 course in 
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which Heidegger addresses explicitly the question of the destiny 
of the West, of Germany, Russia and America, and their tendency 
to institute themselves as systems of total domination), 23 that the 
explication of the "verbal" as opposed to the nominal sense of 
essence (Wesen, read as a verb in the infinitive: to become an 
essence [essenzializzarsi], to determine-itself each and every time 
in a destiny-like manner, in an epochal fashion; to happen [acca-
dere]) is linked both to the awareness of the "weight" that historical 
superpowers possess in determining the destiny of humanity, 
and to the givenness of those "thrown" projections which make 
up, each and every time, time and again, the disclosures of the 
truth of being in which historical humanities (the historical-desti-
nal "essences" of man) define themselves. Now this "weight" that 
leads being to give-itself-to make itself known and happen, take 
place in its epochality and to become event-unveils itself precisely 
in the modern world of science-and-technolgy. This is not, once 
again, an "eternal" structure which would in the end become 
visible only to ourselves: it is rather the epochal happening (com-
ing-to-being) of being within the framework of the conditions that 
can be verified with the technological organization of the world, 
which is "tendentially" totalizing. Heidegger will express all of 
this much later in certain passages of Identity and Difference, in 
which he will speak of the Ge-Stell (which I suggested be translated, 
at least in Italian, as im-posizione, im-position), 24 that is, of the 
system of total organization typical of the techno-scientific view 
of the world, as the fulfillment of metaphysics and as the "first 
flash" of the event of being, in short, as a chance to go beyond 
metaphysics made possible by the fact that in the Ge-Stell man 
and Being lose those very characteristics which metaphysics had 
attributed to them-above all, their position or status as subject 
and object. 25 
3. BEYOND THE SUBJECT? 
It would be yet another metaphysical illusion-implicitly tied 
to the idea that there could be an ordered world of essences-to 
think that we can extract a lesson from Nietzsche and Heidegger 
on the true nature of subjectivity such that we may correct our 
errors concerning this "specific" topos of philosophy. What we 
have found, instead, is that the untenability, the internal contradic-
toriness of the metaphysical conception of the subject (in Nietzsche 
the discovery of its superficiality and its non-finality; in Heidegger 
the experience of the groundless projection) is given only as the 
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collapse of the subject itself in a world radically transformed by 
the techno-scientific organization and which brings to its limit, 
explicitly for Heidegger and implicitly for Nietzsche, the notion 
of metaphysics as the thought of foundations. The "beyonding" 
of the metaphysical conception of the subject is, within this per-
spective, a going beyond the historical-destinal "essences" of 
metaphysical subjectivity, and this involves the problem of the 
surpassing of metaphysics in its concrete-historical givenness, as 
the world of total organization. In short, the fact that Nietzsche's 
overman and Heidegger's "re-calling" thought are not so clearly 
defined as alternative "solutions" to the crisis of (the notion of) 
metaphysical subjectivity should not be taken as a limit or incapac-
ity on the part of either of the two thinkers, but must be understood 
as evidence of a "destining" condition-more specifically, in the 
Heideggerian sense of Geschick, which alludes to a "sending" -
a heritage which calls forth as possibility, and not as a deter-
ministically fixed fate conceivable only within the horizon of 
necessitating metaphysical structures. Since the experience of the 
Ge-Stell-or of the death of God as announced by Nietzsche-
places us in front of the historic-destining of the Wesen, the coming 
to pass of Being, we should not search for guiding threads, 
pointers, or legitimations in suprahistorical structures, but ought 
to look only at the Geschick, at the ensemble of meanings which, 
by taking the risk of interpretation (which can be authentic only 
if it projects itself towards death, if it takes the responsibility of 
its radical groundlessness), we can succeed in recognizing in the 
taking place [accadere] into which we are thrown . 
In different ways but following similar motivations, Nietzsche 
and Heidegger tell us that this happening be defined as Ge-Stell, 
as the world of science-and-technology and that moreover in this 
world we must search for the traits of a post-metaphysical human-
ity which is no longer "subject(ed)" [soggetta]. 
But isn't the world of science-and-technology also the world 
of totalitarian organization, the world of dehumanization, the 
world of planning that reduces every humanity, every individual 
experience, every personal expression to a moment of a statistically 
foreseeable normality or when it doesn't fall within this middling 
capacity, to an accidental marginality devoid of consequence? 
Nietzsche and Heidegger seem to bet, each in his own way, on 
yet another possibility, though this also is tied to the unfolding 
of modern science-and-technology. For Nietzsche, the world in 
which God is dead because the organization of social work has 
rendered superfluous that "excessive" reassurance which it rep-
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resented, is also the world in which reality becomes lighter, in 
which it becomes possible to "dream knowing one is dreaming," 
in which, finally, life can carry on within less dogmatic horizons, 
contexts which are less violent and at the same time explicitly 
dialogical, experimental, risky. It is true that for Nietzsche this 
perspective is fundamentally open only to artists, or at any rate 
only to a sector of humankind, since the majority of people, accord-
ing to him, remain bound to providing, by means of planned 
manual labor, the very freedom of these few. But this is probably 
the aspect of his philosophy which we can define as being still 
"Modern," again st the more explicit "Post-Modernity" of Heideg-
ger. It is likely, in fact, that the elitist and aesthetic conception of 
the overman on Nietzsche's part is secretly linked to an image of 
the world of science-and-technology which is fundamentally 
"machinistic" [macchinica], an idea, that is, according to which 
technology consists above all in the invention of machines in order 
to multiply the physical strength of man and increase his capacity 
of "mechanical" domination (as in moving, relocating, transport-
ing, etc.) over nature . This conception of technology has as its 
paradigmatic model the motor or the engine. To the degree in 
which the capacity of the motor is seen as the capacity to channel 
and utilize energy to induce modifications and physical alterations 
in nature and matter, the overcoming of subjectivity which such 
a technology allows coincides with the overcoming of the subjec-
tion to manual labor; yet this remains the fundamental model of 
any type of labor in a world whose development is conceived 
solely as an ever growing multiplication of the capacity to "move" 
[spostare], to utilize energy in a mechanical sense. 
We can on the other hand hold Heidegger's conception of 
technology as being modelled more or less explicitly upon infor-
mation theory or telematics [informatica], which constitutes the 
essence of Late-Modern or Post-Modern technology. 26 The Ge-Stell 
does not entail the possibility for man to dispose of his metaphys-
ical traits as subject because, in the technological world, he be-
comes factory worker, part and parcel with the machine. More 
radically, instead, information technology seems to render subjec-
tivity unthinkable for it is not given to one subject to possess or 
to manipulate, within a logic still bound to a master-slave 
metaphysics, the information from whose coordination and con-
nections depend the true "power" of the late-modern world. We 
are not talking here of the negative utopia of the robots that would 
take over the world; rather, we are more realistically taking cogni-
zance of the intensification of social complexity, which is not 
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simplified but is rendered more diffuse and pervasive by means 
of the technology that goes with information. This renders the 
conceiving of humanity in terms of multiple "subjective" poles, 
characterized by self-consciousness and by spheres of "conflictual" 
power, rather impossible. Only on this account, perhaps, can the 
Nietzschean and the Heideggerian meditation on the destiny of 
subjectivity in the epoch of the dissolution of being as foundation 
contain for us some indications pregnant with a future. 
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